
The Bourbaki Group. February 2011
“WAR IS WAR BECAUSE THE DEAD ARE INCLUDED IN THE FINAL RECKONING”

Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power
THE HUMAN COST OF THE WAR
TO BUILD A DRUG-TraFFICKING MONOPOLY
IN MEXICO (2008-2009)

THE BOURBAKI GROUP

FEBRUARY 2011

1. The database that provided the building blocks for this work can be found at www.equipobourbaki.blogspot.com

2. “The Bourbaki Group” is a group of researchers from different places and professional backgrounds interested in understanding what is happening in Mexico. Their main tool is the construction of knowledge conducive to the humanization of our world.
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In May 2009, Carlos Montemayor, whose absence we feel so keenly, described the current situation in Mexico as a “preamble to civil war” and warned us that throughout history, every Mexican government had treated civil war as a crime. At the time, we did not yet have the sense that war was looming. We asked ourselves how we might begin to grasp the complexities of the scenario depicted by Carlos Montemayor. How far along were we in the process he was heralding?

It came to us that the way to assemble a picture that could describe, with some clarity, the prevailing trends of the process we were undergoing was to take a second look at the news, which provided daily reports of how that process was unfolding.

The decision involved some challenges: the daily task of rereading all the news reports that in some way reflected part of what was going on proved hard to manage in practice. There was no doubt that we had no information beyond the print media, recalling D. G. Welles, who called it “our daily bread.” Reading, recording, assimilating, and processing that information individually or collectively proved an impossible method for describing and summarizing what was happening around us.

We realized that the massive amount of information we were receiving day in and day out mostly served to frighten us rather than to inform us, for the purpose of helping us to face our fears and get organized and becoming a source of knowledge enabling us to take appropriate action in light of Mexico’s situation. Consequently, we acknowledged that if we had no other source of information than the print media, we could at least use it in a more rigorous, and at the same time objective, manner, recording it and organizing it systematically in order to analyze what was happening in Mexico.

On deciding to begin to log the information in the press, our first quandary was, “Which press?” We started with the assumption that all press was not only a part of reality, but also a reflection thereof in some way. It seemed wise to bear in mind this dual assessment of the press: as part of reality and as a reflection thereof.

We then turned to previous experience, for this situation was not new: We knew people who had undertaken a relatively similar task in the past, with a systematic, orderly approach. In 1994, when we read and then studied the article “El costo humano de la guerra en México”

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[The Human Cost of the War in Mexico], we had been taken by surprise, because our previously held image of Mexico began to break down. They had experienced a dilemma similar to ours: as readers of the print media, they were limited in their analysis and processing, and consequently needed to turn to modern technologies for communications analysis.

The persistence and continuity of this research in “La cuesta de la guerra en México” was a welcome surprise. Reading and studying this work motivated us even further, as it helped to anticipate and predict part of what would later happen in Mexico, so far in advance that we were in no position to face or analyze it. In fact, the studies concluded that Mexico was permeated by two concurrent trends: first, citizens were making slow, cumulative inroads into political spaces, resulting from an organizational restructuring under way across the country; and second, especially in the south, one segment of the population was being unilaterally, selectively excluded and eliminated, signaling a “war of extermination.”

It was these experiences of the past and the analysis of the processes under way in Mexico that persuaded us, starting in 2008, to take on the task of systematically reading the print media and recording the information it provided.

We began our task by determining, by consensus, which set of news items reported by the press in one way or another reported the facts with which we were concerned. The challenge before us was both qualitative and quantitative, and was far beyond our capabilities. In fact, we were close to deciding to abandon this venture.

We became increasingly realistic: we could not tackle all of the print media, but perhaps we could curb our desires and ambitions to match a more humanly possible alternative for our team. We decided to compare all print media containing the same information for clarity and value-free impartiality. We concluded that La Jornada at minimum reported more than did the rest, instead of imposing a biased analysis, and that this information was more befitting of a Mexico that wanted better institutional conditions for society as a whole.

It became apparent that this decision had begun to create the conditions to make our task viable, for it was more feasible to tackle all the news from just one press outlet. Next, we began to locate in that newspaper, every day, the news items that in one way or another reported on the matters of greatest concern to us. It was not long before the quantitative weight of the news items that we had found presented us with a new dilemma: The daily amount of news items outstripped our working capacity. At that point, we made a crucial decision: to consider only those news items that contained human casualties, in their many varying forms.


The wide range of types of human casualties, in turn, also threatened to jeopardize our ability to do our work. We had not initially thought of all the diverse shapes that this notion of “human casualties” could take in the reality of what was taking place in Mexico. It was relatively easy to assume that one category of human casualty would be the irreversible kind: death. Amongst the processes that traditionally caused death, there were also those that caused bodily harm and, of course, varying degrees of deprivation of individual freedom. We also found it necessary to include kidnappings, abductions, and disappearances among our criteria.

We decided to assign a weight to the gravity of each of these categories. Death, of course, was irreversible, and that needed to be reflected. Injuries and detentions had been the traditional forms [of casualty] when political and social clashes reached near-peak levels, as we were reminded by the images in La cuesta de la guerra. 6

In our search for a clear picture, we became aware of a type of human casualty produced in the social realm, which consisted of the exclusion of an employed worker: A substantial number of people had lost their jobs across the spectrum of the occupational structure. Yet we understood that the ideal was the enemy of the possible, so we decided to leave what we came to call the “social casualties” out of our data. Finally we had created the conditions enabling us to carry out a feasible task that we felt would be helpful in understanding what is happening in Mexico.

Having set the conditions for our work, we engaged in a small approximation exercise that provided us with a not-too-distorted picture of what was happening in the country. At that point we decided to record all data provided in the news regarding incidents that produced human casualties, understood to encompass the following: deaths, detentions, injuries, and other (kidnappings, abductions, torture, disappearances, and “threat-induced resignation from work”).

Thus, from August 2008 to August 2009, we entered a total of 9,510 records. These reflect the information contained every 10 days in La Jornada. This decision to log only a sample, and not every day’s news, was not arbitrary. It factored in the cumulative experience of others, including those who had produced the two aforementioned texts, in which a sample of the press had not given a distorted view of the daily news as a whole. Thus, it became even more plausible for us to carry out our task with the resources we had, since our interest was focused on understanding the processes under way and the trends manifested by those processes over time.

6. In “La cuesta de la guerra”, we find that in 1998–1999 the majority of human casualties were harassed or threatened (22%); detained (20%); injured (18%); killed (17%); and “other”—held, kidnapped, evicted, displaced, tortured, raped, deported, or disappeared (19%).
The year that we tracked (2008-2009) gave us a wealth of information that again transcended our capabilities, so we decided to organize it according to the following criteria: how many and which perpetrators carried out the action; how many and which people suffered the consequences of that action; the magnitude and type of casualties produced by said actions; and the time and place of their occurrence.

In the period 1994–2000, the authors of the two previously cited texts had succeeded in constructing a database, with every attribute in their records entered into separate, independent fields.7

Seeing on screen and printed out on paper what was growing into a tremendously difficult-to-understand forest made it possible to see where the values were most concentrated for each of the fields as well as the full spectrum of values for each of those fields. On second look, we realized that the wide range of values contained in each field could be rearranged in terms of their similarities and differences. As we did this, we noticed that the field values were not entirely distinct; in fact, bearing complex conceptual denominations, they sometimes referred to and identified one another.

We then embarked on the task of grouping like with like and extracting and grouping the differences. At this stage in our effort, the impenetrable forest began to reveal distinct trees and to take on a familiar order in each of the fields. We thus began to create our own database.8

Yet we still lacked an understanding of the real, objective relationships that potentially existed amongst the values expressed in the different fields. We once again relied on the experience of others, and discovered it was possible for database entries to be subjected to operations to examine the correlation between the categories and values reflected in each of the fields.9 Until then it had been hard for us to imagine, but we discovered that we could recognize these correlations in our database.10

7. Of the 87 fields, the most important were: news item number, record number; location of item in the paper, location of item on the page; actors; instruments; characteristics of the action; material casualties; human casualties; directionality of the forces involved.

8. Among the 37 fields in our database, for example, we included 4 variables instead of 8 to characterize the “location”; instead of having 14 variables for “actors,” we divided it into two fields: “subject” with two variables and “object” with two variables.

9. This is the method we have followed to explain the process by which human casualties are produced in Mexico. Unlike other studies, ours takes into account the existing correlations between attributes of actions, enabling us to make the process observable. Because other studies do not follow this methodology, they ascribe meaning based only on circulating hypotheses, making it impossible to understand the “how” of human casualties.

10. This is the way we construct knowledge, proceeding from the periphery of the studied actions to the deciphering of their interrelationships and “never fully complete” access to the central meaning of those actions. Jean Piaget, The Grasp of Consciousness.
For this we used two tools: First, we used Excel software to enter all our information into a two-dimensional database, with all the fields containing data in one dimension and the sequence of the unit of records in the other. But the task of discovering relationships amongst the various attributes of those fields was better performed by a different software program—SPSS. We did that as well.

What you are about to read is the initial result of that undertaking, a result of great potential and wealth that from the outset begins to describe much of what we cannot see in our domestic day-to-day lives.

We confirmed that Carlos Montemayor had mostly grasped the truth, but not entirely: by 2008 war was already upon us. The magnitude of the death toll that we discovered through this process was substantial: “So far under this federal administration, 30,196 persons have been executed or lost their lives during clashes between the authorities and organized crime’s hired guns, according to the Office of the Attorney General (PGR).” Of these, “… more than 1,000 children were killed in the last three years as a result of the violence between drug-trafficking gangs and security forces in Mexico, the non-governmental organization Red por los Derechos de la Infancia [Children’s Rights Network] reported yesterday.”

As Elias Canetti had observed:

“A WAR IS A WAR BECAUSE THE DEAD ARE INCLUDED IN THE RECKONING”

Before sharing our work, we wish to apprise the reader of two developments occurring in this first month of 2011 in Mexico, at the time of this study’s publication. First, there is controversy surrounding the actual statistics on executions, since “The data published over the last four years by the Office of the President, the National Security and Research Center (CISEN), the


federal Department of Public Safety (SPP), and the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) are inconsistent" with one another and deviate significantly from press tallies. To illustrate, La Jornada shows how its own data compare with those of the federal government:14

Table 1:
Number of executions during Felipe Calderón’s term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE OF DEATH FIGURES</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>CALDERON ADMIN. 2006-2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEDERAL GOV.</td>
<td>6,837</td>
<td>9,614</td>
<td>15,273</td>
<td>34,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA JORNADA</td>
<td>5,903</td>
<td>7,042</td>
<td>11,759</td>
<td>28,801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: La Jornada, 14 January 2011, p. 5

One of the possible explanations for the contradiction in official numbers, according to members of the national security cabinet, is that “high government figures could be used in the next two years to argue, without it being true, that violence was reduced and criminal organizations disabled.”15

STRATFOR Global Intelligence makes an important contribution in this regard,16 describing in considerable detail the rifts and new alliances among the cartels that are vying for control of drug smuggling throughout Mexico. Their report mentions the high rate of violence being experienced today in the country and gives a death toll that more closely coincides with the figures reported by the newspaper La Jornada than with those currently being given by the federal government (see Figure 1).


15. Ibid.

16. STRATFOR Global Intelligence. Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date, p. 15
This same report notes that the strategy pursued by the Felipe Calderón administration to decapitate certain cartels has led to an escalation in the violence, as the different cartels seek to seize upon the apparent weakness of others to expand their control into new areas.¹⁷

The other development is the debate surrounding the notion of a “war” being waged in Mexico. President Felipe Calderón denies having described the situation in Mexico as a war, instead calling it a “fight for public safety.”¹⁸ What underlies the President’s refusal to accept that what has been unleashed is a war?

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¹⁸. A. Urrutia and G. Castillo. “Niega el jefe del Ejecutivo haber utilizado el concepto “guerra” [The Chief Executive Denies Having Used the Term “War”],” in *La Jornada*, 13 January 2011, p. 7. Calderón made this statement at the Security Dialogue meeting held at Campo Marte by civil society organizations such as México Unido contra la Democracia, consisting of business people and citizens whose families have been victims of organized crime, in response to the remarks of M. Treviño Hoyos: “Mr. President, since you already have chosen the term “war” to describe what we are experiencing ... the power of the State cannot reside in the accumulation of resources and weapons of war; today more than ever, the power of the State must lie in the evident moral superiority of its means and its ends...”. *La Jornada* lists the dates and settings where Mr. Calderón did use the term “war”: on 5 December 2006, with Spanish business leaders, when he affirmed that he would work “to win the war on crime”; on 20 December 2007, with members of the Department of the Navy: “…society gives special recognition to the important role played by our Navy in the war led by my administration against safety threats ...”; and on 12 September 2008, at the opening/closing ceremony for Military Education System courses: “In the war on crime ... there will be no truce ...”.

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**Figure 1**

**DRUG-RELATED DEATHS IN MEXICO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010*</td>
<td>11,041</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reforma *through Dec.13

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INTRODUCTION

To put this report in perspective, it is essential to begin by understanding the historical processes characterizing the 20th century both in Mexico and in the world. It is worth noting that this was the most economically, demographically, and technologically dynamic period in history.19 For its part, the world order of the 20th century seemed to take definitive shape with capitalism established as the dominant mode of production and with nation-states as the mechanism for structuring the international division of labor. Yet as the capitalist system has developed, it has by its inherent logic produced new phenomena that must begin to be made observable in order to understand current social production, not only globally, but particularly in Mexico.

Owing to the dramatic growth in worldwide production, interconnectedness, and globalization, the 20th century was a century of great crises in the global capitalist system, carrying with them a series of consequences fundamental to the restructuring of the national social order. First, it is important to observe that the original government structures of the nation-state are being replaced by other emerging, not-yet-fully-defined forms that undermine the power of the hegemonic group, with the appearance of “transnational entities.” These entities are not part of the wealth of a nation-state in particular, but instead are organized based on other ground rules and territorial interconnections that transcend the borders of the currently known nation-states.

An example of this is seen in the construction of a drug-trafficking monopoly in Mexico and in the transnationalization occurring as part of that process. This would explain the formation of La Federación in October 2001, which began to operate as a council with representatives of the key bosses of the drug-trafficking organizations and ran a large-scale drug transit network, trafficking their illegal goods via land, air, and sea, shipping many tons of cocaine from South America through Central America and Mexico and ultimately off-loading them in the United States.”20

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19. Ciocca, Pierluigi, La economía mundial en el siglo XX [The Global Economy in the 20th Century], Barcelona, Crítica, 2000, p. 14. From 1900 to 2000, the world’s population nearly quadrupled from 1.6 billion to at least 5.5 billion at the start of the third millennium. In this century, industrial production and its link with the tertiary sector underwent extraordinary development vis-à-vis agriculture, which ceased to be the basis of social reproduction. This radical transformation was in part due to technological advances that optimized the production and circulation of goods in an unprecedented way, with the information revolution constituting one of the paradigmatic processes of the end of the 19th century; and in part to the transfer of the labor force from the countryside to industry, with the percentage of agricultural workers in the developed countries decreasing from somewhere between 20% to 40% of the active population in 1900 to just 5% on average by 2000, while workers in the tertiary sector accounted for 65% of the active population in the more developed countries at the end of the 20th century.

By January 2006, according to the United States Department of Justice, drug-trafficking organizations controlled the distribution of cocaine and methamphetamine in most of the United States; in 2007, La Federación was the most powerful drug-trafficking organization in the Americas and the one with the strongest criminal presence in the United States; and “in 2009, midlevel and retail … distribution [of Mexican cartels’ drugs] in the United States was dominated by more than 900,000 criminally active gang members representing approximately 20,000 street gangs in 2,500 cities.”

With the image below, the STRATFOR report illustrates the transnationalization process in Mexico by showing the routes along which the drugs flow into and are distributed throughout the country and the path they take to reach the United States (see Map 1).

Map 1:

Edgardo Buscaglia, a United Nations advisor, professor with the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM), and Director of the International Law and Economic Development Centre, is referring to this transnationalization process when he says: “The North American agencies think that it is always easier to fight a criminal structure, to impose the rules of the


22. STRATFOR Global Intelligence, op. cit., p. 13.
game, but they will not negotiate. When these agencies speak of concentrating and consolidating the criminal market, [it is because] they believe it is always much more viable to control a single, consolidated organization than hundreds of fairly disconnected atoms in a chaotic, unstable state.”

In the following map, we can see how, by 2010, La Federación’s dominance was diminished by the growing power of Los Zetas (giving rise to what is now called the Nueva Federación, or “New Federation,” with the participation of the Sinaloa cartel, the Familia Michoacana, and the Gulf Cartel, which had previously been allied with Los Zetas), resulting in a bloody turf war over smuggling and lucrative territory in Mexico (see Map 2).

Map 2:

As nation-states’ governance structures weaken, they lose their ability to determine the course of economic policies, and thus their essential role in the setting of redistributive policies and in decision-making regarding their place in the global division of labor diminishes. The inability to address the needs of the most disadvantaged groups results in the emergence of “ungoverned territories.” We believe that there are currently countless places in the world and in

Mexico where the “other law” prevails. These other forms of territorial control are fought over and exert dominance “from below,” gaining significance with the scale of conflict and exacting a social cost that is difficult to quantify.

The aim of this work is to begin an in-depth analysis of one of the facets of that social cost: the human cost. On the one hand, this cost is the impact of the process of establishing a new power sphere, run by organized crime, whose dominance hinges on the construction of a growing transnational monopoly over a “new good.”

On the other hand, the human cost confirms that we are in a state of war, as described by Elias Canetti, as we observe that half of the casualties produced are in fact deaths, and that the other half of the casualties are predominantly caused by the same process that led to those deaths.
1. THE HUMAN COST OF THE WAR IN MEXICO

Over the course of one year—August 2008 to August 2009—we found more than 9,000 reports of incidents involving human casualties (see Map 3).

Map 3:
*Total number of reports involving human casualties in Mexico (August 2008–August 2009)*

![Map showing total number of reports involving human casualties in Mexico, with a box highlighting 9,510 reports. Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009.]

Of course, many of these reports reflected a far higher number of human casualties, but what actually interested us was not to investigate the magnitude of these casualties but to identify and understand the processes reflected in the reported acts: What is their nature? And above all, who is perpetrating the actions resulting in casualties, and who are the targets of those actions?

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1.1 What is the nature of the perpetrators of human casualties?

We began to organize all our data around this question, focusing on the core perpetrator of these actions—in some cases individuals, in others, organizations. We found a variety of actors that were unmistakably representative of what we ultimately termed organized crime.26

In correlation with this perpetrator, organized crime, we found a key element indicative of the instrument with which they predominantly carry out their actions: use of an armed force.27 The aggregate of these characteristics—organized crime as the “subject” or perpetrator, using illegal, armed methods—we call the “criminal domain”.

We decided to go through all the records with a view to precisely identifying the domain where the action of organized crime manifested itself. First, we analyzed who was producing human casualties, and discovered that what we have termed organized crime was responsible for a little over half of the actions that resulted in those casualties. Wondering who had brought about the remaining human casualties, we then examined all the other actors and found that those human casualties had, overwhelmingly, been produced by actors belonging to the three branches of government: executive, judicial, and legislative.

We found that two major, significantly overlapping domains immediately emerged, which we ultimately termed the “criminal domain” and the “legal domain”, with each domain determined by the predominant type of perpetrator of human casualties.

It is clear that the presence of individuals typical of the “criminal domain” is not restricted to that domain. We will also see them present in the “legal domain”, where it is the current Mexican government that is responsible for the largest number of actions resulting in human casualties.

26. Annex 1 provides the complete list of terms we identified when we put together our records. See also the database at www.equipobourbaki.blogspot.com.

27. The array of instruments used by organized crime can be found in Annex 1.

28. We draw a distinction between the use of arms and the use of an armed force. The former refers to cases in which an individual uses a weapon in producing the casualty, but the press does not supply information indicating whether or not the individual belongs to an armed group (although in most cases we assume that it may be indicative of pressure exerted by an armed force to join). The latter implies full engagement in an organized group for the purpose of carrying out actions that will potentially bring about human casualties.
The figure below illustrates the relative weight of these two domains in our records.

*Figure 2:*

**Total number of records with human casualties falling under the “criminal domain” and the “legal domain” in Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)**

The above image is intended to depict a situation wherein the two domains overlap. When we analyzed our records, we found that many acts occurred on Mexican soil in two different ways: there were places where the dominance of one of these domains is complete, and others where, in a majority of cases, both domains are present at the same time and overlap one another.

A specific example of this can be seen by looking at the relative territorial presence of these domains—criminal and legal—in two Mexican states with a high concentration of the records of the corresponding events (see Map 4 and Table 2).
Map 4:
Distribution of “criminal domain” and “legal domain” records in Chihuahua and the Federal District

![Map showing distribution of criminal and legal domain records]

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009.

Table 2:
Actions producing casualties under the “criminal domain” and the “legal domain” in Chihuahua and the Federal District. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES</th>
<th>CRIMINAL DOMAIN</th>
<th>LEGAL DOMAIN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHIHUAHUA</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>100% (1260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEDERAL DISTRICT</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>100% (1140)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009.
The reader will have noticed the qualitative difference presented by the two domains—criminal and legal—in these two states. While in Chihuahua, for this period, we observe that 86% of actions producing human casualties originated with the “criminal domain”, in the Federal District, in contrast, the actions producing human casualties that originated with the “legal domain” are greater in number. We assume that this difference in relative weight of the two domains in these two states reflects different processes characterizing those domains.²⁹

This brings us to the question: **What do these processes mean in terms of the human cost they entail?**

### 1.2 What is the nature of the human casualties?

We have looked at the distribution of the total number of actions across the two domains in terms of the identities of those causing the human casualties. It is also worth looking at the extent and nature of these casualties for Mexican society as a whole, as this will give us the social cost of the processes under way throughout Mexico. First, we will examine what the human casualties are—amount and characteristics—for Mexican society as a whole.

#### Table 3:
*Distribution of casualties by degree. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF CASUALTY</th>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEATHS</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER CASUALTIES</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 % (9,510)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009.

We could theoretically separate out the amount of each of the types of human casualty that we have included under “other,”³⁰ but it seemed more telling to start by showing the relative weight for Mexico as a whole of such an extreme value as the number of records reflecting deaths, which is half of all the records reflecting human casualties. In other words, at least one of every two records indicates deaths.

---

²⁹. This is meant to serve as an example, showing that the distribution varies across states. Annex 2 describes the presence of the two domains in each of the states.

³⁰. Kidnapping, abduction, torture, disappearance, extradition, exile, and “threat-induced resignation.”
We found that the ratio of records reflecting deaths to those reflecting other casualties, to our surprise, remained similar over the course of the year (see Table 4).

**Table 4:**
Distribution of deaths and other casualties over time. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEATHS</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIRST 6 MONTHS</strong></td>
<td>48 % (229)</td>
<td>51 % (240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECOND 6 MONTHS</strong></td>
<td>52 % (249)</td>
<td>49 % (233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL RECORDS</strong></td>
<td>100 % (478)</td>
<td>100 % (473)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at the casualties by six-month period shows that the intensity of the processes under way remained relatively constant over the year documented. In contrast, we observed that these processes did not behave the same way across the states.

Below we will describe the characteristics of the sphere of each of the identified domains. For each of the two domains, we will first consider their percentage of total casualties throughout Mexico; second, the categories of people impacted by the casualty-producing actions (in Mexico as a whole and then in certain states, to illustrate the different processes); and last, the relationship between the types of human casualties produced.

### 1.3 What are the characteristics of the “criminal domain”?

As we have seen, 52 % of the 9,510 records reflect the “criminal domain.” As already noted, this domain consists of a type of actor (individuals or organizations) that makes use of a particular instrument (weapons and/or and armed force), which we have termed organized crime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRIMINAL DOMAIN</th>
<th>4,900 records</th>
<th>100 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009.
To gain a clearer understanding of the result of the processes underlying the “criminal domain”, we need to describe the relationships established between that actor and each of the categories of people making up the total number of casualties produced by the actor in this domain. In other words: Who is the object of the violence in the “criminal domain”? And for each category, what types of casualties are produced?

Below we will describe who receives the blow of the violent actions carried out by organized crime.

**Table 5:**
**Distribution of “criminal domain” casualties by category of victim.**
**Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY OF VICTIM</th>
<th>CRIMINAL DOMAIN</th>
<th>TOTAL CASUALTIES IN MEXICO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>50 %</td>
<td>29 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL SOCIETY</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>29 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMED FORCES</td>
<td>19 %</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 % (4,900)</td>
<td>100 % (9,510)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009.

These are the terms denoting the categories of victim:

**Unknown:** According to the press, their social and political affiliation is also undetermined. Presumably they are from the circle that surrounds the “hard core” of organized crime.

**Civil society:** Citizens from civil society who receive the impact of the “criminal domain’s” aggression. Refers to the institutional identity of these individuals; actions are by virtue of their citizen identity and are not necessarily linked to the confrontational processes in organized crime.31

**Armed forces:** The different institutional levels of armed forces (federal, state, and municipal), public safety, judiciary (repressive apparatus of the State).

---

31. Examples of civil society: migrants; journalists and reporters; peasants; business owners; merchants; political party, social movement, and union members; young people; children; villagers, workers (taxi driver, nurse, chauffeur, construction worker, laborer, server, diner, relative of business person, foreigner). For a list of all victims categorized as “civil society” see Annex 1 and the database at [www.equipobourbaki.blogspot.com](http://www.equipobourbaki.blogspot.com).
Government authorities: Civil authorities at the federal, state, and municipal levels.

Criminal organization: Individuals unmistakably belonging to organized crime; may be considered its “hard core.”

Let us now look at the casualties caused by the “criminal domain” in a set of Mexican states, for illustrative purposes.\(^{32}\)

**Table 6:**
**Distribution of human casualties by category of victims of the “criminal domain” and by state. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY / STATES</th>
<th>BAJA CALIFORNIA</th>
<th>CHIHUAHUA</th>
<th>GUERRERO</th>
<th>MICHOACAN</th>
<th>MEX. ST.</th>
<th>F.D.</th>
<th>CHIAPAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL SOCIETY</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIMINAL ORG.</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMED FORCES</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100% (360)</td>
<td>100% (1,260)</td>
<td>100% (730)</td>
<td>100% (200)</td>
<td>100% (220)</td>
<td>100% (240)</td>
<td>100% (50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009.

Once again we find that regardless of where we find the “criminal domain”, the categories suffering the most casualties are “unknown” and “civil society.” Looking at these two categories on a state-by-state basis, however, we can see that either one or the other—and not both—predominates in terms of casualties in this domain, which again alerts us to the fact that in those states it is different confrontational processes that are causing the casualties.

---

\(^{32}\) To see how these processes play out in all the states, see Annexes 2 and 3.
1.3.1 Types of casualties in the “criminal domain”

We have seen who the casualties are. If we look at the number of records indicating deaths in relation to those indicating other casualties in the “criminal domain”, we will see that the percentage is far higher than for Mexico as a whole.

Table 7:
Distribution of human casualties in the “criminal domain” by type of casualty. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF CASUALTY</th>
<th>CRIMINAL DOMAIN</th>
<th>TOTAL CASUALTIES IN MEXICO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEATHS</td>
<td>84 %</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER CASUALTIES</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 % (4,900)</td>
<td>100 % (9,510)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009.

In the case of the “criminal domain”, the table shows that the majority of actions perpetrated by organized crime result in deaths, by a wide margin compared to Mexico overall.

Let us now look at the percentage of each type of casualty by category of victim in the “criminal domain” (see Table 8).

Table 8:
Distribution of deaths and other casualties by category of victim in the “criminal domain”. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY OF VICTIM</th>
<th>DEATHS</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>56 %</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMED FORCES</td>
<td>18 %</td>
<td>23 %</td>
<td>22 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL SOCIETY</td>
<td>17 %</td>
<td>53 %</td>
<td>19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIMINAL ORG.</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 % (4,130)</td>
<td>100 % (770)</td>
<td>100 % (4,900)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009.
This table shows that a little over half of those who die are “unknown,” followed by the armed forces and civil society; while the pattern is the opposite for other human casualties (detainment, injuries, kidnapping, abductions, disappearances), with over half of the casualties affecting civil society, followed by the armed forces and “unknown.” Members of criminal organizations and government authorities accounted for the fewest casualties in the “criminal domain”.

It is worth noting that the overall pattern in this process is driven by the pattern for “deaths”. Let us now look at the type and percentages of human casualties that constitute what we call “other” casualties caused by the “criminal domain” (see Figure 3).

Importantly, nearly all these other human casualties are part of the underlying process that causes the deaths.33

**Figure 3:**
*Distribution of other casualties by type of victim in the “criminal domain”. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPES OF OTHER HUMAN CASUALTIES</th>
<th>OTHER CASUALTIES IN THE CRIMINAL DOMAIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISAPPEARED</td>
<td>33 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INJURY</td>
<td>29 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIDNAPPING</td>
<td>19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABDUCTION</td>
<td>17 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIGNATION UNDER THREAT</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 % (3,960)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009.

Note: Normally, where a news item featured more than one type of casualty, we gave priority to the casualty that we considered to be highest on the scale of social conflict. This figure, in contrast, shows all the categories that make up the “other” human casualties, including those that occurred in combination with deaths and were generally not counted.

33. We observed that many of the casualties other than deaths occurred as a consequence of activities resulting in deaths. This is what we found in news items where a single action by the subject caused several types of casualties. We called this “combined casualties,” where, for example, there were deaths, injuries, and disappearances. To avoid duplicating records, we always counted only one type of casualty—the one that reflected the highest degree of conflict (in this example, deaths).
We must recall, however, that all the casualties making up the “other” category account for 16% of total casualties caused by the “criminal domain”.

If we now consider each of the categories of victim affected by the “criminal domain” individually, we observe that the predominant type of casualty suffered in each is death. However, regardless of the total number of actions producing deaths under each category, the ratio between these actions and the others carried out by organized crime (causing casualties other than death) is not the same from category to category.

If we look at Table 9, two things stand out: first, the categories of victim that organized crime, when it acts, seeks to kill, and for which the vast majority of casualties are deaths (80% to 95%); are “unknown,” “government authorities,” “criminal organization,” and “armed forces.” It is also striking that amongst these categories, those who suffer a lower percentage of deaths are the more powerful forces: “criminal organization” and “armed forces” versus “government authorities” and “unknown.” We might therefore assume that this great multitude of dying “unknowns” constitute a kind of social support network for the other three categories in the battle they are waging amongst themselves. Or, they might be a part of defenseless “civil society” that is resisting being recruited into the ranks of organized crime.

This table also clearly shows that for the category of “civil society”, organized crime causes a significantly lower relative percentage of deaths than in the other categories (63% of all casualties). It is true that deaths still account for two thirds of the civil society casualties caused by organized crime, but this is the category that most suffers the other types of human casualties (other than death) caused by the “criminal domain” (Table 9).

**Table 9:**

*Distribution of categories of victim of the “criminal domain” by type of casualty.*

*Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY / TYPE OF CASUALTY</th>
<th>UNKNOWN</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES</th>
<th>CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>ARMED FORCES</th>
<th>CIVIL SOCIETY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEATHS</td>
<td>95 %</td>
<td>92 %</td>
<td>84 %</td>
<td>80 %</td>
<td>63 %</td>
<td>84 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>37 %</td>
<td>16 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 % (2,420)</td>
<td>100 % (130)</td>
<td>100 % (310)</td>
<td>100 % (940)</td>
<td>100 % (1,100)</td>
<td>100 % (4,900)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009.
It is therefore worthwhile to explore the processes resulting in the large majority of “other” casualties in Mexico. This is why we decided to also examine what we call the “legal domain,” which is described below.

1.4 What are the characteristics of the “legal domain”?

If we look at the realm we call the “legal domain”, we see that, just like the “criminal domain”, it affects Mexico’s states differently.34

The “legal domain”, present throughout Mexico, accounts for 48% of the 9,510 total records involving human casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGAL DOMAIN</th>
<th>4,610 records</th>
<th>100 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009.

Recall that these two domains (the “criminal domain” and the “legal domain”) represent two processes under way throughout Mexico to varying degrees, not only in terms of the extent of their territorial presence, but also in terms of the identity of those involved, in the fields corresponding to who performs the action and whom it affects.

We can see, for example, diversity in both the identities of the subjects performing the actions in the “legal domain” as well as the objects of those actions, i.e. the human casualties. Based on the relationship between perpetrator and victim, we have grouped the records into three distinct clusters, or categories, which we call: “repression of crime,” “repression of society,” and “conflict within the legal order.”

34. Annex 3 further illustrates the crosscutting presence of these two domains throughout Mexico’s states.
What makes up each of these clusters or categories?

**Repression of society:** These records reflect the traditional containment of social struggles and the tendency by legal armed forces representing the different levels of government to repress them.\(^{35}\)

**Repression of crime:** In general, the same subjects from the previous category perform the action; however, the focus is on fighting crime in its various manifestations.\(^{36}\)

**Conflict within the legal order:** These records reflect clashes between the various political forces (armed forces, judicial branch, and the political powers that be at their different hierarchical levels) and those who suffer the consequences of these conflicts, who may belong to the governmental, civil, or political-institutional sphere.\(^{37}\)

We see that the predominant actor in this cluster is the armed/law-enforcement apparatus of the State, but civil society also generates human casualties, accounting for no less than 15\% of total actions performed in this domain. The following is an illustration of the relative magnitude of each category of the “legal domain” in Mexico as a whole.

**Figure 4:**
*Distribution of casualties by “legal domain” category. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLUSTERS IN THE LEGAL DOMAIN</th>
<th>MAGNITUDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repression of society</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression of crime</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict within the legal apparatus</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (4,610)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009
As the figure shows, a high percentage of the actions performed by subjects from the legal domain produce casualties aimed at repressing society.

It is striking that there is more repression of society than repression of crime, when it is so often said that the government’s policy is to fight crime and wage a “war against drug trafficking.”

Table 10 illustrates the distribution of the different categories in six of the country’s states (see Table 10).

**Table 10:**
*Distribution of casualties in certain states by “legal domain” category.*
*Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES/CATEGORIES</th>
<th>BAJA CALIFORNIA</th>
<th>CHIHUAHUA</th>
<th>FEDERAL DISTRICT</th>
<th>STATE OF MEXICO</th>
<th>GUERRERO</th>
<th>OAXACA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REPRESSION OF CRIME</td>
<td>62 %</td>
<td>57 %</td>
<td>39 %</td>
<td>28 %</td>
<td>28 %</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFLICT WITHIN THE LEGAL ORDER</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>27 %</td>
<td>19 %</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPRESSION OF SOCIETY</td>
<td>29 %</td>
<td>33 %</td>
<td>34 %</td>
<td>53 %</td>
<td>67 %</td>
<td>84 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 % (340)</td>
<td>100 % (210)</td>
<td>100 % (900)</td>
<td>100 % (430)</td>
<td>100 % (180)</td>
<td>100 % (130)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009

It is interesting to note that the relative weight of these three categories comprising the “legal domain” is different from state to state. In other words, the process under way in the states is not homogeneous, but divergent. As the table shows, in northern Mexico, where organized crime has gained ground, the “law” represses mainly crime, whereas in the south, where social problems abound, repression is focused mainly on society.

**1.4.1 Types of casualties in the “legal domain”**

We have seen which groups are producing and which are suffering casualties in each of the categories comprising the “legal domain”. Let us now look at a comparison between the casualties resulting in death and the “other” casualties in this domain. A large majority of the casualties are not deaths, but rather what we call “other” casualties (arrests, injuries, disappearances, abductions, kidnappings, torture, exile, extradition, threat-induced resignation, etc.) (see Table 11).
Table 11:
Distribution of human casualties by type in each domain. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF CASUALTY</th>
<th>CRIMINAL DOMAIN CASUALTIES</th>
<th>LEGAL DOMAIN CASUALTIES</th>
<th>TOTAL CASUALTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEATH</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER CASUALTIES</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100% (4,900)</td>
<td>100% (4,610)</td>
<td>100% (9,510)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009

If we compare the distribution of all casualties throughout Mexico, we see that the relationship between the two types of casualties generated by each domain is completely inverse. In other words, the “legal domain” generates mainly “other” casualties, while the “criminal domain” predominantly generates deaths.

The figure below illustrates the percentages of each type of casualty in each of the categories comprising the “legal domain”:

Figure 5: Distribution of casualty type in the “legal domain” categories. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009
Figure 5 shows that only 5% of the records categorized as conflict within the legal order indicate deaths; the vast majority indicate other casualties. Likewise, only 7% of the records categorized as repression of crime indicate deaths, while most indicate other casualties.

However, it deserves mention that actions performed in the “legal domain” for the purpose of repressing society result in death 25% of the time. While “other” casualties still represent the majority in this category of the “legal domain”, this is where the deaths generated in the overall domain are concentrated. Repression of society generates five times more actions causing death than the category of conflict within the legal order, and almost four times more than those generated by repression of crime.

The following figure gives a breakdown of the types of casualties that we have called “other” casualties in the “legal domain” (see Figure 6).

**Figure 6:**
*Distribution of “other” casualties in the “legal domain” by the type of casualty suffered by victims. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPES OF “OTHER” CASUALTIES</th>
<th>“OTHER” CASUALTIES IN THE LEGAL DOMAIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARRESTS</td>
<td>82 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INJURIES</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISAPPEARANCES</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISMISSALS</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER (KIDNAPPING, EXILE, TORTURE)</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100% (3,960)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009

Note: Normally, where a news item featured more than one type of casualty, we gave priority to the casualty that we considered to be highest on the scale of social conflict. This figure, in contrast, shows all the categories that make up the “other” human casualties, including those that occurred in combination with deaths and were generally not counted.
As Figure 6 shows, when we refer to other human casualties, in reality they are almost all arrests.

It is important to note that these casualties under the “legal domain” are mostly produced by the State apparatus, and only to a minor degree by civil society.

Recall that the “criminal domain”, in contrast, generates predominantly deaths, and these human casualties are produced outside the rule of law. Nevertheless, as shown before, the “criminal domain” is also responsible for producing its share of the “other” human casualties, albeit to a lesser degree (see Figure 3).

At the same time, the “legal domain” also generates deaths, although it generates a minor share. This is one of the indicators of interpenetration across the two domains.

1.5 Interpenetration between the “criminal domain” and the “legal domain”

These two domains do not act independently of one another, as mentioned earlier. Yet how is the interpenetrated operation of the “legal domain” and the “criminal domain” explained?

This interpenetration becomes evident when we examine the relationship between the two domains at the state level. The relationship between domains and among the categories comprising the “legal domain” is not homogenous across states. For example, it is clear that in some of Mexico’s states, such as Chihuahua, the “criminal domain” is predominant. In others, the relationship between the domains is more equal, as found in Baja California; and lastly, in some states the “legal domain” is predominant, such as in the Federal District38 (see Table 12).

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38. See Annex 3 for a state-by-state comparison.
Table 12: Distribution of human casualties in certain states by domain. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)

According to the table below, it would appear that when the level of conflict within the legal order is lowest, one of two situations arises: either the repression of society is higher, as in Oaxaca and Guerrero, or the repression of crime is intensified, as in Baja California and Chihuahua. When conflict within the legal order increases, however, repression of crime and repression of society are equally high. This could indicate that the lower the level of conflict within the legal order, the clearer the direction of the repressive process: depending on the arrangement and identity of the predominant legal order, repression is directed either at society or at crime (see Table 13).

Table 13: Distribution of casualties in certain states by “legal domain” category. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)

Table 12: Distribution of human casualties in certain states by domain. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES/ DOMAINS</th>
<th>CHIHUAHUA</th>
<th>GUERRERO</th>
<th>BAJA CALIFORNIA</th>
<th>OAXACA</th>
<th>STATE OF MEXICO</th>
<th>FEDERAL DISTRICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRIMINAL DOMAIN</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGAL DOMAIN</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100% (1,470)</td>
<td>100% (910)</td>
<td>100% (700)</td>
<td>100% (230)</td>
<td>100% (650)</td>
<td>100% (230)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009

Table 13: Distribution of casualties in certain states by “legal domain” category. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES/ CATEGORIES</th>
<th>BAJA CALIFORNIA</th>
<th>CHIHUAHUA</th>
<th>FEDERAL DISTRICT</th>
<th>STATE OF MEXICO</th>
<th>GUERRERO</th>
<th>OAXACA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REPRESSSION OF CRIME</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFLICT WITHIN THE LEGAL APPARATUS</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPRESSSION OF SOCIETY</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100% (3,400)</td>
<td>100% (2,100)</td>
<td>100% (9,000)</td>
<td>100% (4,300)</td>
<td>100% (1,800)</td>
<td>100% (1,300)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009
Having characterized the legal and criminal domains, let us examine their relationship in greater detail in certain states. Table 14 shows that Chihuahua and Guerrero have a similar relationship between the two domains, with the “criminal domain” clearly predominant. However, in Chihuahua, there is a greater tendency toward repression of crime in the “legal domain”, whereas in Guerrero, the tendency is toward repression of society.

Table 14:
Distribution of casualties in certain states between the “criminal domain” and the categories of the “legal domain”. Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES/ DOMAINS</th>
<th>CHIHUAHUA</th>
<th>GUERRERO</th>
<th>BAJA CALIFORNIA</th>
<th>FEDERAL DISTRICT</th>
<th>STATE OF MEXICO</th>
<th>OAXACA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRIMINAL DOMAIN</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPRESSION OF CRIME</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFLICT WITHIN THE LEGAL ORDER</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPRESSION OF SOCIETY</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100% (1,470)</td>
<td>100% (910)</td>
<td>100% (700)</td>
<td>100% (1,140)</td>
<td>100% (650)</td>
<td>100% (230)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009

States like Oaxaca and Guerrero, which are different in terms of the relationship between the two domains, do present similarities, however, in terms of the process leading to casualties within the “legal domain”, where the dominant category for both states is the repression of society.

One can see also that in some states, such as Chihuahua and Guerrero, where conflict within the legal order is least prevalent, the “criminal domain” is stronger, and repression of society and/or of crime less so.

In contrast, in those states where there is greater conflict within the legal order, such as the Federal District and the State of Mexico, the “criminal domain” does not have the impact it does in Chihuahua and Guerrero. However, both repression of society and repression of crime are greater than in states where the criminal order is predominant (see Table 14).
Consequently, there are three possible scenarios. First: heavy dominance of the “criminal domain”, with the lowest level of conflict within the legal order, and one of two possibilities regarding repression on the part of legitimate law enforcement—a tendency toward repressing either crime (e.g. Chihuahua) or society (e.g. Guerrero) (see Table 14).

For the second scenario, there are states where the weight of the two domains is balanced, and where generally the level of conflict within the legal order is greater than in those states where there is a clear predominance of the “criminal domain” and lower than in those states where the “legal domain” is predominant. Nevertheless, repression is clearly aimed either toward crime (e.g. Baja California) or society (e.g. Oaxaca) (see Tables 12, 13, and 14).

Lastly, in the third scenario, where the “legal domain” is predominant, we see the highest level of conflict within that realm, with the targets of repression tending to be distributed equally. It is not yet possible to predict the outcome of these conflicts within the legal order, and hence the definitive target of repression after those conflicts have been resolved cannot be predicted either. (Some examples of this situation are the Federal District and the State of Mexico.) (See Tables 12, 13, and 14.)

In other words, the nature of each state’s decision as to which direction repression will take depends on the relative strength of the “criminal domain” compared to that of the “legal domain” as well as the degree of conflict present within the “legal domain”.

Mexico as a whole would fall under the second scenario because the two domains are equally present and the level of conflict within the legal order (26%) is lower than in states where the “criminal domain” is predominant and higher than in states where the “legal domain” is predominant. At the national level, targets of repression are also relatively balanced, although there is more of a tendency toward repressing society (43%) than repressing crime (31%) (see Figure 4).

Is Mexico’s transition toward predominance of the “criminal domain” inevitable? What are the determining factors? A high-level arrangement between the State and organized crime? Is there a chance such an arrangement will not be reached? If so, what would this scenario look like for the country?

The different forms of interpenetration occurring at the state level would lend credence to several of the hypotheses circulating in the political arena suggesting that a segment of the “legal domain” may be hiring members of the “criminal domain” to carry out illegal actions, against other organized crime members as well as against representatives of society and the political class (a possible example being the assassination of candidates in various state and municipal elections, as well as assassination of social activists). In exchange, it would appear that this segment of the “criminal domain” may be afforded protection by the segment of the “legal domain” with which it is directly connected.
2. A provisional analysis: Crime between criminals as unlawful capitalist competition for the purpose of creating a monopoly

In the current shifting national landscape, there is increasingly clear evidence of the expanding power of the “criminal domain”, buoyed by a major mobilization of economic resources outside what we know as the “legal market,” but which itself constitutes a good whose evolution mirrors the evolution of the capitalist system in general.

The hard core of activity currently outside the margins of the law represents the moment we know as the original accumulation. Traditionally, original accumulation is known as the process of separating producers from their means of production and creating a market out of those means of production. This separation occurs violently, through the use of force. In our case study, it could be said that force is used in the sense that territory for production and distribution of the new good must be controlled, generating a violent mechanism that guarantees the widespread reproduction of capitalist accumulation. This new good, which is still illegal, generates an unimaginable level of profits compared to any other legal good, and just as in the case of the early beginnings of current legal goods, it is necessary to use the State apparatus to build not only this exceptional capacity for accumulation, but also the protections for its violent administration.

THE STATE IS CHARGED WITH ENSURING THAT CAPITALIST ACCUMULATION CAN OCCUR BY DEFENDING AND PROTECTING THE DIFFERENT MONOPOLIES, OR RATHER, PROTECTING CERTAIN MONOPOLIES FROM COMPETITION SO THEY MAY SECURE THE MARKET FOR THEIR PRODUCT.

Lastly, once this good has matured, it will be the State that again steps in to regulate, institutionalize, and legalize production and distribution, thus reducing the social cost of its production, distribution, and consumption.

Reviewing our data, we see that half of our records provide very interesting information with respect to the “criminal domain” that is penetrating legality with this new good. A large majority of the records in this domain show that deaths account for the vast share of casualties.
The total number of records involving deaths in this domain represented no less than 84% of all casualties, compared to the various “other” casualties—detentions, injuries, kidnappings, abductions, torture—representing only 16%. We have grouped together a subset of the dead who cannot be identified due to a lack of information. This group, which accounts for over half of all deaths (56%), we have called “unknown.”

We also see the position held in this domain by what we consider to be the “hard core of criminal activity,” which is reflected in records showing that both perpetrators of the actions and victims could be identified as belonging to the organizational structure of the “criminal domain”. In this case, they represent 6% of the total volume of records involving death. By comparison, the relative weight of casualties suffered by “government authorities” and “armed forces” was 21% of all death-related records.

Lastly, we have separated out the relative impact of these casualties on “civil society,” because it is interesting to note that not everything is explained by the process of combatting organized crime. This becomes particularly relevant when we examine how the “other” casualties produced in the “criminal domain” are distributed, especially in terms of sequence: civil society suffers over half of all other casualties (see Table 15).

Table 15:
Distribution of casualties in the “criminal domain” by category of victim.
Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY OF VICTIM</th>
<th>DEATHS</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMED FORCES</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL SOCIETY</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100% (4,130)</td>
<td>100% (770)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009
So we have a sequence that we could loosely summarize as forming two counter-directional vectors in the “criminal domain”: one pointing toward a concentration of deaths among the “unknown,” and another pointing toward a concentration of “other” casualties among civil society. Midway along these two vectors are the two realms into which we first divided Mexico: the “criminal domain” and the “legal domain”. It could be assumed that these identities—the hard core of criminal activity, government authorities, and the armed forces—form the top of the pyramid that in one way or another is responsible for the majority of casualties in both domains (see Table 9 on page 28).

At this point, in order to gain more clarity regarding these processes, it is worthwhile to examine the relationship between the two types of casualties in each category. In the “unknown” category, 95% of the casualties were deaths; for government authorities, 92% of the casualties were deaths; for organized crime, 84%; for the armed forces, 80%; and civil society was last, with 63%.

**IN THE “CRIMINAL DOMAIN”, DEATH IS THE DOMINANT TYPE OF CASUALTY**
(See Table 9, page 28)

If we compare the “unknown” to the victims in the groups at the top of the pyramid responsible for these processes (government authorities, organized crime, and armed forces), it is evident that in each group the pattern is very similar in terms of the main type of casualty they suffer, which, predominantly, is death.

Presumably this task of identification is not carried out so as not to endanger the life of those who should perform it. But could it perhaps be that the top of the pyramid has decided not to reveal the identity of the dead so as not to expose itself publically and thus to hide the ever more widespread existence of their executing arms or of those who refuse to participate? This would explain why

THE “UNKNOWN” HAVE FORMED WHAT WE COULD CALL A NEW TYPE OF IDENTITY: THE SOCIALLY “DISAPPEARED,” OR IN OTHER WORDS, THE UNIDENTIFIED DEAD.

In the case of civil society, unlike the other groups who are victims of organized crime, although death is the main type of casualty it suffers in this domain, it is the group that suffers most from “other” casualties. Thus it could be said that this group experiences another, inverted determinantal in the way that organized crime primarily causes its casualties. This is one of the main indicators that another kind of process is coexisting parallel to the actions of organized crime, termed the “legal domain”, as a cause of casualties throughout Mexico (see Table 9, page 28).

It should be pointed out that Mexico as a whole does not show the same patterns as the “criminal domain” in terms of “other” casualties. In fact, an analysis of the “legal domain” shows that it basically makes up the other half of our records and largely generates what we call the “other” human casualties, which do bear some relationship to the “criminal domain.”

In the “legal domain”, based on the information gathered in these records, we have identified three substantive processes: repression of society, repression of crime, and conflict or confrontations within the legal order. Now, these processes correlate with the strength of the “criminal domain”, given that

WHEN THE DOMINANCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME HAS BEEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED IN AN AREA, CONFLICT WITHIN THE LEGAL ORDER DECREASES AND REPRESION OF CRIME OR SOCIETY INCREASES.
Essentially, when we look at these three major processes in relation to total casualties, the first thing that stands out is that the opposite seems to occur—the other side of the coin—compared to what we saw above in relation to the “criminal domain”. For all three of these processes in this domain, the casualties are not primarily deaths. And the margin is substantial. Another striking element is that the processes relating to the confrontations that we consider true “conflict within the legal order” result in the lowest percentage of deaths among the casualties. Only 5% of these conflict-related processes result in death. (See Figure 7.)

Figure 7:  
*Distribution of types of casualties in the “legal domain” categories.*  
*Mexico (August 2008 to August 2009)*

![Figure 7: Distribution of types of casualties in the “legal domain” categories.](chart.png)  
Source: The authors, based on newspaper data, 2008-2009
Two considerations deserve attention: First, it is evident that the human casualties produced by the process of repressing crime are practically the same as those produced by conflict within the legal order, and this confirms the relationship that exists between the actors in both categories, i.e., what we have been calling the top of the pyramid—a relationship that was glimpsed in the analysis of the “criminal domain”.

Figure 7 also showed that 25% of the casualties resulting from repressing society in the “legal domain” involved death, and that statistic is consistent with information given in the two reference texts mentioned in the preface to this report.

“THE HUMAN COST OF THE WAR” AND “THE DESCENT INTO WAR” REFER TO A KIND OF “SELECTIVE EXTERMINATION QUOTA” THAT THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT “CHARGES” THE SEGMENT OF SOCIETY THAT DARES TO FIGHT TO DEFEND ITS HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS OF THE GROUPS THEY REPRESENT, DEMANDING GREATER JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY.39

At the same time, the next table (Table 16) illustrates another process that is worth highlighting:

THE HIGHEST CONCENTRATION OF DEATHS AMONG THE CASUALTIES IN THE LEGAL DOMAIN IS UNDER “REPRESSION OF SOCIETY” (75%). IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE VICTIMS IN THIS CATEGORY REPRESENT A LINK, ACTING ALMOST AS A HINGE BETWEEN THE TWO DOMAINS, AS ALSO APPRECIATED DURING ANALYSIS OF THE “CRIMINAL DOMAIN”.

39. *El costo humano de la guerra* affirms that every year from 1994 to 1999, “acts of force” consistently targeted 20% to 25% of all social struggles.
In closing, we conclude that for the year 2008-2009, the human cost of the confrontations on Mexican soil is the result of the process of developing a new good, and its main victims are the “unknown” and civil society—on the one hand, those who would appear to be the executing arms of the groups controlling the flow of this process (organized crime, government authorities, and the armed forces), and on the other, those who are opposed to the shape of this process and to its criminalization, although most of the latter group is not directly on the front lines of this so-called “war on drug trafficking,” which we have been told is being waged in our country. We can now understand why Carlos Montemayor was warning us in 2009 that the conditions were in place for a “civil war.” According to our records, by 2008 this war to build a drug-trafficking monopoly was actually already well under way.

Given this situation, we wonder:

**WHAT IS THE FUTURE OUTLOOK FOR OUR COUNTRY?**

**WHICH PATH WILL BE CHOSEN TO STEM THE GROWING VIOLENCE?**

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40. According to the 2010 Annual Report produced by STRATFOR Global Intelligence, the only way to lessen the increasing violence that Mexico is experiencing today, is to restore the balance of power—which used to exist between the cartels—that was destroyed by the war strategy employed by the Felipe Calderón administration in recent years. The report states that this can only be accomplished through one of two scenarios: the first involves receiving more assistance and involvement from foreign governments; the second involves increased strength and dominance of a single cartel or an alliance such as La Federación, which would entail a degree of complicity on the part of the Mexican government.
Our reference to the mercantile-capitalist nature of this process involves vitally important social, economic, and political complexities.

WHAT IS HAPPENING IN MEXICO IS PART OF AN OVERARCHING PROCESS THAT TRANSCENDS ITS BORDERS. IT IS ONE MOMENT IN A BROADER, ONGOING, CONFLICTIVE PROCESS THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY CONNECTS MANY OTHER NATIONS ACROSS THE GLOBE. IT IS, WITHOUT QUESTION, THE EXPRESSION OF AN INTER-CAPITALIST STRUGGLE OF INTERNATIONAL SCOPE … AND WILL BE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME.

The Bourbaki Group


Hernández, Anabel. *Los señores del narco* [The Drug Lords], Random House Mondadori, Mexico, November 2010.


STRATFOR Global Intelligence. “Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date.” United States, 2010.


Here is the main terminology used by the print media, categorized as shown below, under “subject,” “object,” and “instrument.”

For those interested in the simple frequency of each of these categories, please consult the complete SPSS database at: www.equipobourbaki.blogspot.com

CATEGORY: SUBJECT (Subject 2) PERFORMING THE ACTION

1. CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION

1.1 criminal organization: El Bombón gang, Banda de la Flor, Banda Los Rojos, gangs, criminal gang, Arellano Félix cartel, Sinaloa cartel, La Familia cartel, commando, armed commando, organized crime, hooded men dressed in black, “El Pitufo”, the Pineda Villa family, trigger-men, heavily armed group, criminal underworld, armed men, men with assault rifles, armed individuals, drug traffickers, Los Valencia organization, gunmen, gunmen from the Sinaloa and Juárez cartels, La Línea gunmen, federal police belonging to the Gulf cartel, abductor, allegedly part of organized crime, alleged kidnapper, hired killers, cartel hitmen, Los Zetas

1.2 criminal

1.3 unidentified forces: aggressors, attackers, killers, unknown, group of hooded men, individuals, vehicle occupants, persons, unidentified gunmen, of unestablished identity, subjects, subjects dressed in black

1.4 grupo de choque [mercenary group of thugs]

2. LAW ENFORCEMENT

2.1 police: riot police, traffic officers and director of the corporation, prison guards, former municipal police officer, private security, neighborhood security guard, granaderos [riot police] (granaderos and Federal District police task force), ministerio público [office of public prosecutors and investigative police], police officer, police from the civil protection unit (UPC), state police, federal preventive police (federal police), judicial police, municipal police officers, state preventive police, ministerial police (ministerial investigative police, ministerial agents [prosecutors’ investigating agents], ministerial state police), state police and justice personnel, state police and municipal police (special operations group), federal police and municipal police, federal police and state police (Oaxacan state preventive police, agents from the state investigative agency and the federal preventive police) federal preventive police (PFP), state police and carriers, mu-
nicipal police and the Office of the Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection (PROFEPA), police officers from the Federal District Department of Public Security (SSP-DF), Department of Public Security (SSP) agents, sector police and the Organization for the Defense of Indigenous and Campesino Rights (OPPDIC), office of the state attorney general and the department of public safety and civil protection, office of the state attorney general, ministerial agents, State Security Agency (ASE) [State of Mexico].

2.2 law enforcement institutions

2.3 state security forces

2.4 foreign armed forces: United States Border Patrol, United States Coast Guard, Peruvian police

3. MILITARY

3.1 military: Mexican army, troops, militia, Special Forces Airmobile Group (GAFE), elite military group, military operations, personnel assigned to Joint Operation Juárez, military personnel, fifth battalion of special forces of the Mexican army, soldiers, 93rd Infantry Battalion

3.2 retired general

3.3 army and federal and state police

3.4 urban joint operations unit (BOMU), federal and state agencies, National Defense Department (SEDENA)

3.5 military and federal forces (army and PFP); army, PFP, municipal police, and ministerial police; army, federal, state and municipal police

3.6 Mexican military troops and agents from the public safety directorate, ministerial police and the municipal public safety directorate

3.7 military and police

3.8 Federal SSP and National Defense Department (SEDENA) representatives

3.9 army and navy

3.10 army and PGR [Attorney General's Office]

3.11 armed forces of Colombia
4. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES

4.1 municipal authorities: mayor, local authorities, village authorities, delegation officials, authorities and inhabitants

4.2 federal and state authorities: federal authorities, state officials (authorities of the State of Mexico, Director of the Primary Education Institute of Morelos, education officials, state governor), Institute of the National Fund for Workers’ Housing (INFONAVIT), Department of the Interior

4.3 legal or judicial authorities: foreign legal forces (from Argentina, from the United States), Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), National Migration Institute (INM), judge (federal, criminal, district), Superior Court of Justice (TSJ)

5. CIVIL SOCIETY

5.1 civic organizations: residential home, ejido [communally-owned land] official, residents (resident organizer), general council of the university, business owner—company (private/state-owned) productive organization, political party, university rector’s office, university

5.2 workers: merchant, workers (haulers, Association of Metro Venders, Peddlers and Hawkers)

5.3 population: students, minor, prisoners

CATEGORY: OBJECT (Object 2) AFFECTED BY THE ACTION

1. CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION

1.1 criminal organization: the Gulf cartel (Queen of the Pacific), persons with criminal records, Sinaloa cartel, alleged criminals, drug dealers, kidnapping logistics operators, alleged leader of the Banda de La Flor gang, suspects of the attack, Los Zetas cartel, alleged abductor, alleged kidnappers, group of gunmen, triggerman, drug traffickers, triggermen from La Federación, Los Pelones criminal organization, detainees arrested for homicide, La Familia criminal organization, the Arellano Félix brothers cartel, the Juárez cartel, persons accused of committing 12 executions, persons involved in mayor's crime, “Los Rojos” band of kidnappers, Mexican and Guatemalan drug traffickers, Guatemalan kingpin, U.S. citizen wanted for kidnapping and extortion, triggermen, brothers from the Tijuana cartel, an important woman in the money-laundering business, Scottish man, alleged traffickers of undocumented aliens, abductors, sex worker assailants, fishing crew transporting cocaine, gang members, Jalisco cartel kingpin, “Los Zodiacos” band of kidnappers, gang working for Marco Antonio Guzmán Zúñiga: a.k.a. El Flaco, persons carrying high-powered weapons, head of the La Línea gang, subjects under

1.2 criminal: assailants, extortionist, thieves, alleged crook, alleged perpetrator of the homicide

2. GOVERNMENT ARMED FORCES

2.1 police: Federal Preventive Police (PFP) (officers, regional security coordinator, members of the force, bodyguards, inspector, inspector general of the Federal Preventive Police, Federal Police, deputy officer), municipal police (municipal police agents, commander of the municipal police, coordinators, director, director of operations, officers from the municipal police, former police officer from Salamanca and another subject, patrol officers and commanders, deputy director of the municipal police); preventive police (director of the preventive police, municipal preventive police chief, municipal preventive police official, preventive police officers, municipal preventive police, preventive police supervisor); police, judges, municipal authorities, members of police forces (officers, officials, auxiliary police, law enforcement officers, uniformed officers, municipal and state police, private security guards), traffic police, state police (family members of the state police officer), state and municipal police (police aggressors in the Atenco operation), PFP and capital police, suspended municipal police officer and jail guard, tourism police, municipal police officer, former police officer and another subject, private security, inter-municipal police (commander), state police and family members, preventive police and criminal organization (police commander and members of the *Los Pelones* group of hitmen; commander of the reception area of the ministerial police accused of ties to organized crime; cell leader of the Beltrán Leyva brothers’ cartel and municipal officers), escort (bodyguard)

2.2 public safety authorities: Office of the State Attorney General (PGJE) (commander of the Office of the Attorney General of Jalisco, chief of the homicide division, clerk of criminal court 11 of the Superior Court of Justice of the Federal District), Public security-directorate (inter-municipal police commander, director of operations, state investigative directorate, director of public safety, PGR officials, police chief and his wife, police chief, public safety director, municipal public safety department, director of the State Police Academy; manager of command headquarters, [female] group chiefs from the ministerial police, first commanding officer in civil protection and regional commander; first commanding officer of the municipal police, first commanding officer of the local police, state attorney general’s nephew, police supervisor, Secretary of Public Safety Department, city government safety chief, deputy director of public safety and head of security department, head of the Department of Public Safety and Metropolitan Transportation), public safety directorate and municipal police commander, PGR (federal agents, PGR officials); prison system (guards, jail warden, prison warden, guards
and former prison officials, guard of prison two in Gómez Palacio, penitentiary director, 5
bodyguards; heads of security, municipal police and former prison director; state Attorney
General’s office (coordinator of state Attorney General’s office advisers, attorney general’s
office of Jalisco, chief of the international homicide division, Deputy Attorney General for
Organized Crime Affairs of the state), Office of the Attorney General of the Federal District
(PGJDF) (Reaction and Intervention Task Force (GERI) and kidnapper) (GERI commanders and
leader of a band of kidnappers; GERI commanders, agents from the Special Anti-kidnapping
Force (FAS), former police official (former director of the Assistant Attorney General’s Office
for Special Investigations on Organized Crime (SIEDO) and former INTERPOL director, former
drug czar, former judicial police officer, former commander of the federal preventive police,
former ministerial police officer, former federal investigation agents, former officer from the
state investigative agency; former police chief, former state ministerial police officer, former
federal investigative agents, former commander of the Federal Preventive Police); municipal
authorities and preventive police (preventive police and chief of city government secretariat),
family member of an official (of a judge, of the State Attorney General)

2.3 judicial system: Superior Court of Justice (TSJ) (justices of the electoral criminal chamber
of the Superior Court of Querétaro); legal representative (legal representative of Diasar, at-
torney, professor of law at UNAM’s law school)

2.4 investigative police: ministerial police officers (ministerial police group chief, ministerial
agent [investigating agent for prosecutors], state ministerial police officers, state ministerial
investigative police officers, regional commander of the ministerial investigative police (PIM)
of Guerrero, group chief of the ministerial police, SIEDO (Deputy Attorney General for Or-
ganized Crime Affairs, Office of the Deputy Attorney General for Special Investigations on
Organized Crime of the PGR), kidnapping negotiator, SIEDO, and the Federal Investigation
Agency (AFI)

2.5 military: Military and PFP (Mexican army and Federal Preventive Police (PFP), military (sol-
dier, brigadier general, lieutenants, and a retired general, brother of an army major, former
captain, captain of the 85th infantry battalion of the Mexican army), army and alleged hitmen

3. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES

3.1 official: state official, municipal official, President of the Electoral Institute of the Federal
District (IEDF), Asset Administration and Disposal Service (SAE); director of Procurement, Storage,
and Inventory of the Department of the Interior, Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior,
official from the Tax Administration System (SAT), member of Congress for the National Action
Party (PAN); director of public services and escort for the administration of the PAN mayor;
chair of the Governance Committee of the State Congress; brother of the district prosecutor,
cousin of the governor of Michoacán; municipal president from the Democratic Revolution
Party (PRD), coordinator of advisors for the government Department of Rural Development,
the former federal *Ministerio Público* agent assigned to the PGR at city hall; mayors and public servants

3.2 municipal authorities: mayor, city council member, mayor on leave, delegate, secretary, representative of the city government, PRD city council members

3.3 customs supervisor

3.4 former public official: former municipal president, former district coordinators of Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) day care centers, former public servants, former director of the State Water and Sanitation Commission (CEAS); former municipal president of La Huacana, Michoacán; former Secretary of Tourism, former public servants, former local legislator from the PAN, former director of the Casitas del Sur residential home, former prosecutor and former state Secretary of the Economy

4. **UNKNOWN**

4.1 kidnapping victims

4.2 people: adolescent, corpse, civilian, U.S. citizens, family, brothers, man, squatters, youth, locals, woman, woman unjustly held in a women's prison, murder victims, remains of a male, a relative of the kidnapper and neighbors, parish priest, person, persons with military-style haircuts, persons with a *narcomensaje* [message from drug traffickers], residents, representative of residents, election officer, catholic priest, sex workers, unknown identity, unidentified subjects, community residents, one, unidentified victims

5. **CIVIL SOCIETY**

5.1 organized society: bases of EZLN support [Zapatista Army of National Liberation] (supporters, members of the EZLN; Zapatista indigenous groups, Zapatistas); campesino and rancher (Regional Ranching Union of the state of Guerrero, Rogaciano Alva Álvarez, [communal land owners]); merchant (merchant and family members—parents and children); business owner (owner of the Amores Bar, car salesmen, former PRD city council member and bar owner, owners of a day care center and the adjacent tire repair center), Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), family member of business owner (brother of the Amores Bar owner); indigenous people (indigenous people, indigenous people from Chiapas, Mixtecs, an indigenous man from Oaxaca, Organization for the Future of the Mixtec People (OFPM), Tlapanec indigenous people, mechanics, inmates of El Amate jail, Tzeltal villager, Otomí indigenous person); social organization (social activist, members of *la Otra Campaña* [the other campaign], Andrés Reyes Amaya and Gabriel Alberto Cruz Sánchez, activists from the Movement of Triqui Unification and Struggle (MULT), Popular Assembly of the People of Oaxaca (APPO), campesino members
of la Otra Campaña, Committee for Citizen Defense and Assistance to Rural Communities (CODECI), group, leaders of the Independent Regional Campesino Movement (MOCRI), leader of the citizen movement against mining, leaders of the Organization for the Future of the Mixtec People, former political prisoner, the People’s Front in Defense of the Earth (FPDT), the Reyes Amaya brothers, social activist and former ejido official from Huizopa, Francisco Paredes de Fundación Diego Lucero, member of the Me’phaá Organization of Indigenous Peoples (OPIM), member of the organization of sex workers and transsexuals, members of the Valle de Ocotlán Defense of Natural Resources and Our Mother Earth Coordinating Group and of the Committee for the Defense of the People’s Rights (CODEP) associated with the APPO, Magisterial Democratic Movement, women from the town of Atenco, the Sierra de Petatlán and Coyuca de Catalán Environmental Organization, representative of the legitimate government, Emiliano Zapata Popular Revolutionary Association, Association of Peoples from the Eastern Zone, worker organization (national association of doctors for the state-owned oil company, leaders of the National Union of Mine and Metal Workers of the Mexican Republic, former president of the general council of vigilance and justice for the mining union, mining union leader, members of the national association of doctors for the state-owned oil company, teachers, secretary general of the State Union of Education Workers (SETE), haulers, Ciudad Azteca Association of Metro Vendors, Peddlers and Hawkers, National Association of Textile Industry Federations and Labor Unions), government institution (owners of a day care center and the adjacent tire repair center), political party (mayor on leave running as PRD candidate, mayor on leave running for Congress as PRD candidate, Convergencia candidate, Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) brigade members, mayoral candidate, PRI candidate for síndico [auditor], former leader, former PRD leader and former senate assistant, former PRD municipal leader, Labor Party (PT) brigade, PAN activist, brother of the national PAN congresswoman, brother of the former PRI local assemblywoman, director of municipal residents for buying PAN votes, political party family member, possibly PRI supporters and representatives from the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes (FEPADE), PRD council member and brothers), politician, reporters (photo journalists, communications specialist, journalists, reporters and camera crews), organized workers (flower growers from Atenco, soccer team, teachers), university workers (university authority, academic leadership unit)

5.2 population

5.3 workers: workers (academic, bricklayer, Televisión por Cable (TVC) camera crew and a taxi driver; research scientist, driver, radio host, accountants who allegedly worked for Los Zetas, taco stand employees, employees of the Canadian mining company, mine employees of the Mexico group, bodyguard for the businessman’s son, employees of city hall’s finance office, nurse, Banorte branch manager, engineers and workers, day laborers and builders, teacher, waitress at La Juerga bar, waiter, workers, farm worker, public service providers, janitorial worker at the Red Cross hospital, workers at the state Department of Infrastructure, taxi driver, [female] maquiladora worker, miners, PEMEX [State-owned oil company] workers, factory worker, watchman at the Department of Education); Prisoners (convalescent inmates, fugitives, inmate, injured youths, prison inmates, rival groups); Migrants (Guatemalans, Hondurans, Ecuadorians,
Central Americans, Central American migrant women), young people, students and children, Catholic priest, election officer, relative of the kidnapper and neighbors

**CATEGORY: INSTRUMENT (Instrument) USED TO PERFORM THE ACTION**

1: legal and armed forces

2: illegal and armed forces

3: legal judicial

4: legal institutional

5: illegal judicial

6: illegal institutional

7: legal institutional and armed forces

8: illegal and use of arms (injuries due to demonstration beatings)

9: illegal entrepreneurial

10: sabotage (accident)
ANNEX 2. “CRIMINAL DOMAIN” AND “LEGAL DOMAIN” BY MEXICAN STATE

Table listing the states and showing percentages of activity carried out by the “criminal domain” and the “legal domain”. Mexico (August 2008–August 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>CRIMINAL DOMAIN</th>
<th>LEGAL DOMAIN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colima</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100% (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>100% (1,470)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>100% (280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>100% (150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrero</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100% (910)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinaloa</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>100% (540)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintana Roo</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>100% (60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonora</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>100% (200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>100% (120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baja California</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>100% (700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis Potosi</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100% (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tlaxcala</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100% (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veracruz</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100% (240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yucatán</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100% (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>100% (200)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>100% (230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nayarit</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>100% (140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coahuila</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>100% (170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of México</td>
<td>34%</td>
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<td>100% (650)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michoacán</td>
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<td>67%</td>
<td>100% (600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morelos</td>
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<td>67%</td>
<td>100% (240)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tabasco</td>
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<td>67%</td>
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<td>Campeche</td>
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<td>67%</td>
<td>100% (80)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puebla</td>
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<td>67%</td>
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<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>69%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hidalgo</td>
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<td>69%</td>
<td>100% (130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamaulipas</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>100% (90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal District</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>100% (1,140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiapas</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>100% (390)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo León</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>100% (170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Querétaro</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>100% (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baja California Sur</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100% (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9,410*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The total number of records is 9,510. The remaining 100 records are not included in the table because the incidents—mostly arrests or extraditions—occurred outside Mexico